ARTICLE | 9 MIN

Why Patience Matters During Market Stress

April 15, 2025

Trend investors have had a bumpy ride so far this year, but how does today compare with history?

Key takeaways:

  • In trend investing, patience is more than a virtue. History shows that holding your nerve during market crises can be financially rewarded. The ‘dot-com’ bust, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the 2022 inflation episode all saw trend-following strategies lose before delivering substantial gains
  • Trend strategies often require time to adjust positioning and capitalise on emerging trends during market dislocations
  • Observing recurring patterns across crises can help investors adapt and generate ‘crisis alpha’

All good things come to those who wait. After the dramatic volatility driven by President Trump’s on-again-off-again tariff policies, trend followers may well feel unsettled. Yet historical crises show that staying invested is required to reap the rewards.

In this article, we analyse historical patterns across major market dislocations, in the context of today’s events. In the first section, we examine what is happening now, and why. In the second, we look at recurring historical patterns during equity crises, and find that trend following often wobbles before delivering on its crisis alpha credentials.

Part one: What is happening in 2025?

To say market uncertainty is high is an understatement. By market close on 11 April, the S&P 500 Index had fallen 8.1% over the year, NASDAQ 10.0% and crude oil 12.3%. There have been few places to hide, with historic ‘safe havens’ such as the dollar and developed government bonds failing to deliver returns to offset April’s equity rout. For traditional multi-asset investors, this has been a painful ride so far, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Performance year to date, at market close on 11 April 2025

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg, SocGen. Market sets for illustration only. Markets represented by: Crude oil: WTI. Trend-following: Société Générale Trend Index, US dollar: DXY index.

Trend-following has historically performed positively during large market moves, so why is it seemingly not working in 2025?

Correction or crisis?

Perhaps a better question would be: why isn’t trend following working yet? At the onset of a downturn, investors often look expectantly toward trend-following strategies, only to find themselves asking: "Where is my convexity?" This natural question highlights an important nuance in how trend strategies respond to market dislocations.

As we outlined in our previous research (Trend Following: Loading the Dice), trend-following strategies are frequently characterised as being 'long volatility'. While this description holds merit when evaluated over extended timeframes of weeks or months, the relationship becomes more complex during sharp, short-lived volatility spikes.

Figure 2. S&P 500 drawdown dates and length versus trend-following returns

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg. Using crisis dates from the ‘Best of Strategies for the Worst of Times'. Trend-following represented as SG Trend index. Chart is shown from Jan 2000 – present, based on inception of SG Trend index being in January 2000. The size of each dot relates to the magnitude of trend-following returns.

The critical distinction lies in the nature of the selloff, and whether it is a correction or a crisis. As seen in Figure 2, trend strategies have historically delivered robust performance during sustained market drawdowns.1 However, their behaviour during compressed, highly volatile episodes more closely resembles a roll of the dice – heavily dependent on positioning at the moment volatility erupts.

Full-blown market crises rarely manifest as clean, straight-line moves. Instead, they typically develop through distinct phases marked by significant whipsawing before a clear direction emerges. These violent reversals can temporarily wrong-foot even the most robust trend models, although these initial periods of heightened volatility serve as a recalibration mechanism, where market participants assimilate new information into prices. We observe this in Figure 3 below, which shows that prior to the official start (high watermark) of each crisis, equities had already shown signs of whipsawing.

Figure 3. Performance of the S&P 500 in the three months prior and three months after the ‘crisis start’ date of the dot-com bubble, GFC and 2022 inflation episode

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg. Date range: Jan 2000 – Dec 2022.

Part two: Recurring patterns

While each crisis unfolds differently, we observe recurring patterns in how trend strategies adapt and eventually deliver crisis alpha:

1. Initial shock and position misalignment

When market dislocations first emerge, trend models typically carry legacy positions calibrated to the pre-crisis environment. This initial misalignment can result in losses as rapid price movements contradict established trends. Performance during this early phase depends heavily on pre-existing positions and can vary significantly across different crisis periods. What remains consistent, however, is that trend models require time to adjust to the new market reality.

2. Adaptive recalibration

As a crisis develops, trend models begin their adaptation process — de-risking where appropriate and identifying emerging trends. This recalibration period often includes both gains and losses as positions are adjusted to align with evolving market directions. The speed of adaptation and robust risk management become critical during this phase. Recent examples include the tactical repositioning in US 10-year Treasury futures over the past week, where trend-following breakout models quickly identified and capitalised on new directional moves.

3. Delivering crisis alpha

Following this period of recalibration, trend-following strategies eventually align with the sustained market moves that typically characterise crises, sizing up positions accordingly and help deliver the crisis alpha that investors desire. This phase has historically coincided with stronger returns as strategies leverage clear directional moves across multiple asset classes.

Indeed, looking at major equity market dislocations of the past several decades, from the dot-com bubble, to the GFC, to 2022’s inflation spike, we observe initial sharp moves; frequently followed by counter-trend rallies or reversals before markets go into an all-in capitulation; and eventual recovery. We focus on these examples in more detail below.

The dot-com experience (September 2000 – October 2002)

During the dot-com bubble, trend-following strategies (as proxied by the Société Générale Trend Index) initially struggled to find their footing as equities whipsawed, losing approximately 10% before finding their stride. Once models recalibrated, investors who maintained their allocations were eventually rewarded with returns exceeding 40%, as the crisis fully developed.

Notably, even on the path to these impressive gains, trend followers endured another 20% drawdown, illustrating that the journey to crisis alpha is rarely linear. This pattern underscores the importance of patience and conviction when allocating to trend strategies during market stress.

Figure 4. Performance of the Société Générale Trend Index and S&P 500 in the three months prior and during the dot-com bubble

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg. Date range: Jun 2000 – Oct 2002.

Figure 5. Drawdown of the Société Générale Trend Index in the three months prior and during the dot-com bubble

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg. Date range: Jun 2000 – Oct 2002.

The GFC pattern (October 2007 – March 2009)

The onset of the GFC also presented a similar pattern. The S&P 500 Index suffered a 9% drawdown within one month during the summer of 2007 before rebounding to a fresh high in October 2007. As illustrated in the chart below, trend strategies initially failed to deliver convexity, suffering a drawdown of nearly 17%. However, trend strategies had already adapted, with defensive positions in place to deliver crisis alpha once the S&P entered into a more prolonged bear market, rewarding those with the patience to hold the strategy.

Figure 6. Performance of the Société Générale Trend Index and S&P 500 in the three months prior and during the GFC crisis

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg. Date range: Jul 2007 – Dec 2009.

Figure 7. Drawdown of the Société Générale Trend Index in the three months prior and during the GFC

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg. Date range: Jul 2007 – Dec 2009.

The inflation episode (January 2022 – October 2022)

Beyond the two growth-driven crises, we can also draw parallels to inflationary crises, specifically focusing on the most recent episode. The S&P 500 experienced a fairly sharp ~4% drawdown in November 2021, triggering a contemporaneous ~6% reversal for trend-following. However, risk in the strategy was subsequently cut and positions began to adapt, with trend-following experiencing more muted performance during this recalibration phase. Once equities resumed their decline in early 2022, the continuous upside surprises in inflation led to the formation of trends, and trend-following was able to benefit.

It is worth highlighting that, much like in the dot-com bubble, the path to crisis alpha was not linear. Trend-following strategies endured a mini-correction in June-July 2022, prior to delivering further gains as the equity sell off deepened from August onwards.

Figure 8. Performance of the Société Générale Trend Index and S&P 500 in the three months prior and during the inflation episode of 2022

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg. Date range: Oct 2021 – Oct 2022.

Figure 9. Drawdown of the Société Générale Trend Index in the three months prior and during the inflation episode of 2022

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg. Date range: Oct 2021 – Oct 2022.

Bringing this all together in Figure 10, the common thread across different crisis periods is that patience was rewarded. While investors must endure periods of drawdown and volatility along the way, historical evidence suggests that trend following ultimately can deliver meaningful crisis protection for those willing to maintain their allocations through the full cycle. Each crisis may follow a unique trajectory, but the pattern of initial pain followed by eventual gain remains remarkably consistent.

Figure 10. The Société Générale Trend Index versus the S&P 500 during major crises (t=0, three months before the start of the crisis)

Source: Man Group database, Bloomberg. Date range: Jan 2000 - Oct 2022.

Conclusion: Laws of unintended consequences

Current market moves are testament to the fact that we are currently witnessing a profound transformation that is reshaping the global economic order, driven by the US administration’s sweeping policies. History suggests that policy shifts tend to have lasting unintended and unexpected consequences that ripple through markets as participants take time to digest their impact. If the current level of uncertainty and volatility – from both a price and policy perspective – persists, there is an elevated chance of disruption. Trend-following has so far borne the brunt of the initial market shock and misalignment, but positions have undergone a period of adaptive recalibration. As per the Société Générale Trend indicator, trend-following is currently positioned towards a more defensive stance – short equities, long bonds and short energies, for example. Perhaps one may take the view that the initial drawdown can be regarded as a cheapening of the entry point for this crisis alpha strategy, in contrast to traditional defensive strategies, such as puts.

While we make no claims as to be able to predict the future path of returns, if markets do find their way into a more protracted period of weakness, the prevailing positions may be well-positioned to deliver crisis alpha. As history has repeatedly shown, trend can indeed be a friend in times of market stress – but it's a friend that tends to show up just before the real party begins.

1. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

With special thanks to Eva Sanchez Martin and Adi Mackic for their contributions to this article.

Appendix 1: Crisis dates

  Start date End date
Dot Com Bubble 2000-09-05 2002-10-09
GFC 2007-10-10 2009-03-09
Inflation 2022-01-04 2022-10-12

This information is communicated and/or distributed by the relevant Man entity identified below (collectively the "Company") subject to the following conditions and restriction in their respective jurisdictions.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and may not be shared by all personnel of Man Group plc (‘Man’). These opinions are subject to change without notice, are for information purposes only and do not constitute an offer or invitation to make an investment in any financial instrument or in any product to which the Company and/or its affiliates provides investment advisory or any other financial services. Any organisations, financial instrument or products described in this material are mentioned for reference purposes only which should not be considered a recommendation for their purchase or sale. Neither the Company nor the authors shall be liable to any person for any action taken on the basis of the information provided. Some statements contained in this material concerning goals, strategies, outlook or other non-historical matters may be forward-looking statements and are based on current indicators and expectations. These forward-looking statements speak only as of the date on which they are made, and the Company undertakes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in the statements. The Company and/or its affiliates may or may not have a position in any financial instrument mentioned and may or may not be actively trading in any such securities. Unless stated otherwise all information is provided by the Company. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Unless stated otherwise this information is communicated by the relevant entity listed below.

Australia: To the extent this material is distributed in Australia it is communicated by Man Investments Australia Limited ABN 47 002 747 480 AFSL 240581, which is regulated by the Australian Securities & Investments Commission ('ASIC'). This information has been prepared without taking into account anyone’s objectives, financial situation or needs.

Austria/Germany/Liechtenstein: To the extent this material is distributed in Austria, Germany and/or Liechtenstein it is communicated by Man (Europe) AG, which is authorised and regulated by the Liechtenstein Financial Market Authority (FMA). Man (Europe) AG is registered in the Principality of Liechtenstein no. FL-0002.420.371-2. Man (Europe) AG is an associated participant in the investor compensation scheme, which is operated by the Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Foundation PCC (FL-0002.039.614-1) and corresponds with EU law. Further information is available on the Foundation's website under www.eas-liechtenstein.li.

European Economic Area: Unless indicated otherwise this material is communicated in the European Economic Area by Man Asset Management (Ireland) Limited (‘MAMIL’) which is registered in Ireland under company number 250493 and has its registered office at 70 Sir John Rogerson's Quay, Grand Canal Dock, Dublin 2, Ireland. MAMIL is authorised and regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland under number C22513.

Hong Kong SAR: To the extent this material is distributed in Hong Kong SAR, this material is communicated by Man Investments (Hong Kong) Limited and has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong.

Japan: To the extent this material is distributed in Japan it is communicated by Man Group Japan Limited, Financial Instruments Business Operator, Director of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Financial instruments firms) No. 624 for the purpose of providing information on investment strategies, investment services, etc. provided by Man Group, and is not a disclosure document based on laws and regulations. This material can only be communicated only to professional investors (i.e. specific investors or institutional investors as defined under Financial Instruments Exchange Law) who may have sufficient knowledge and experience of related risks.

Switzerland: To the extent this material is made available in Switzerland the communicating entity is:

  • For Clients (as such term is defined in the Swiss Financial Services Act): Man Investments (CH) AG, Huobstrasse 3, 8808 Pfäffikon SZ, Switzerland. Man Investment (CH) AG is regulated by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (‘FINMA’); and
  • For Financial Service Providers (as defined in Art. 3 d. of FINSA, which are not Clients): Man Investments AG, Huobstrasse 3, 8808 Pfäffikon SZ, Switzerland, which is regulated by FINMA.

United Kingdom: Unless indicated otherwise this material is communicated in the United Kingdom by Man Solutions Limited ('MSL') which is a private limited company registered in England and Wales under number 3385362. MSL is authorised and regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (the 'FCA') under number 185637 and has its registered office at Riverbank House, 2 Swan Lane, London, EC4R 3AD, United Kingdom.

United States: To the extent this material is distributed in the United States, it is communicated and distributed by Man Investments, Inc. (‘Man Investments’). Man Investments is registered as a broker-dealer with the SEC and is a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (‘FINRA’). Man Investments is also a member of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (‘SIPC’). Man Investments is a wholly owned subsidiary of Man Group plc. The registration and memberships described above in no way imply a certain level of skill or expertise or that the SEC, FINRA or the SIPC have endorsed Man Investments. Man Investments Inc, 1345 Avenue of the Americas, 21st Floor, New York, NY 10105.

This material is proprietary information and may not be reproduced or otherwise disseminated in whole or in part without prior written consent. Any data services and information available from public sources used in the creation of this material are believed to be reliable. However accuracy is not warranted or guaranteed. © Man 2025