What does “whole-of society resilience” mean in practice? Listen to Jason Mitchell discuss with Sherin Aminossehe, MoD, and Alicia Kedzierski, FCA, about what’s at stake, where the lines of responsibility between government and firms should fall, and what an investable resilience opportunity looks like.
Recording date: 28 October 2026
Sherin Aminossehe
Sherin Aminossehe is Director of Growth and Missions at the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
Alicia Kedzierski is Head of Sustainable Finance and Defence, Security, and Resilience at the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
Episode Transcript
Note: This transcription was generated using a combination of speech recognition software and human transcribers and may contain errors. As a part of this process, this transcript has also been edited for clarity.
Jason Mitchell:
I'm Jason Mitchell, CIO for Responsible Investment at Man Group. You're listening to A Sustainable Future, our podcast about what we're doing today to build a more sustainable world tomorrow. Hi everyone. Welcome back to the podcast and I hope everyone is staying well. So imagine a normal morning, except a foreign research vessel is spotted off the British coast. At first, subsea cables start showing intermittent faults. Then financial data begins to lag. Nothing too dramatic at first, just a few delays. But then trades start missing their settlement windows and the failures spread into other markets. And then a cyber attack takes down access to critical government and private sector services.
Look, I know it sounds almost like the opening pages of a Cold War spy novel, but it's the scenario that the Financial Conduct Authority and the Ministry of Defence put in front of a group of us from finance, government, and the defence industry at their Defence, Security, and Resilience Lab earlier this year. And the findings were kind of revealing. It turns out that firms are generally pretty resilient and good at identifying their own weaknesses, but they were a lot less confident about the shared dependencies, think communications networks, satellite systems, subsea cables, and public databases that everyone relies on and no single firm controls.
Now, identifying those vulnerabilities is one thing. Investing to fix them is another, which is why firms want a clear steer from government on national threats and priorities before committing capital. And that need for direction brings us to the government's Defence Investment Plan published this past June, which treats homeland defence, cyber and resilience as priorities in their own right, and also promises a defence finance and investment strategy to try to crowd private capital into this effort.
All of this raises the questions I really want to get into here. Like what does whole of society resilience actually mean in practise? Who pays for redundancy that may never be used? Why do defence SMEs struggle to get bank accounts or finance contracts they've already won? And if as the FCA has said, sustainability rules don't block defence investment, then what's really standing in the way?
It's why I'm pleased to have two people on the podcast who've been at the centre of all this work. Sherin Aminossehe is director of growth and missions at the Ministry of Defence, and Alicia Kedzierski is head of sustainable finance and defence security and resilience at the FCA. We talk about what the lab exposed, where the lines of responsibility between firms and government should fall, what an investible resilience opportunity looks like, and what would tell us that our whole of society resilience has moved well beyond rhetoric.
Welcome to the podcast, Alicia and Sherin. It's great to be here recording at the FCA's headquarters. And of course, thank you for taking the time to talk. Alicia Kedzierski: Thank you so much for coming in.
Sherin Aminossehe:
Thank you for having me. Really looking forward to it.
Jason Mitchell:
Great. I'm really looking forward to this conversation. So Sherin, let's start out with some scene setting. Several months ago, the FCA and Ministry of Defence convened the Defence, Security, and Resilience Lab. It was basically a full day game simulation exercise that combined navigation spoofing, damage to subsea cables, and a cyber attack on a cable landing station. And if I'm completely honest, I found it super, super interesting how the lab that day expanded my own definition of resilience, which tends to be more anchored on the climate risk side. But if you step back, what's at stake here, especially as the British public hears more and more about potential threats to national infrastructure and the need of a frank conversation around defence?
Sherin Aminossehe:
Absolutely. And you probably would've heard recently that our Secretary of State started talking about resilience and the need for preparedness. Of course, wound up radios sold out on the same day as did bottled water a couple of days afterwards. So for me, it's about that balance. So the lab was very much showing actually what a plausible combination of incidents can actually cascade around sectors that I think normally we wouldn't necessarily think of as being connected, but can have quite a serious risk. So the issue is really talking about it in a way that is about keeping daily life as it is, but understanding what those risks can be and actually seeing what are the fundamental things that essential public services depend on and actually our way of life depends on.
So to me, it's not scaremongering. This isn't like some people might have seen the Sky War Games two part series, which was also really interesting. So it's not about causing alarm, but it's about talking about resilience as a shared national endeavour. And that's not just about MOD, it's broader. As Alicia showed, it is about the FCA, it's about the financial sector, et cetera, that actually we all need to think about this together.
Jason Mitchell:
Yeah. It sounds like you're referencing the government's be ready campaign, which points to risks like extreme weather, cyber attacks, and even more. But why now? My sense is that's the big question of the public. Why the sudden urgency now?
Sherin Aminossehe:
It's not actually sudden. So if you look more globally, the Nordic countries have been talking about this for a long time. This is a conversation that's been in the public consciousness for quite a while. I think the fact is that it's become public, as in the media much more, hence the sell out of the radios, but it isn't actually anything new. It's something new for us to be concentrating on, but nothing that suddenly appeared out of nowhere or because there's a major risk that the world's about to end.
Jason Mitchell:
Alicia, talk about your takeaways from the lab. What do you think it revealed about the financial system's shared dependencies that maybe a single firm exercise would've missed? I'm wondering how you see those customers or even markets feeling those effects first. And also, what were the big assumptions we've made about resilience at the firm level that the exercise ended up most challenging? Alicia Kedzierski: So in terms of what customers and the markets would feel, it would very much depend on the type of risk or attack because there's such a broad range that can occur. In terms of the lab itself, we designed it specifically to step away from just thinking about single firm impact because we do a lot of work and this work is very separate to our much more business as usual work around understanding individual firm resilience, which I suspect we'll come onto later as well. But this was about understanding actually that much more systemic impact, but also, and this was quite critical in the design of it, not just bringing operational resilience experts in from firms, but actually bringing in the front line from different financial services firms for them to be part of that exercise.
Because one of the things that really came out to us when we originally put out the defence statement, we came out in March 2025 saying that there was nothing in our sustainability rules that didn't allow for investment into the defence sector. And after that, we started to look into more extensively any of the challenges around defence investment. And from that, we realised that there may be that disconnect between what the frontline understands of shared dependencies and wider systemic risks and what the op res part of different institutions understood. So the lab was meant to bring in that frontline and from that frontline, we wanted to also understand where some of those frictions or challenges would be in financing defence investment.
And one of the things that we really found from it was that they really need those signals from government to understand where they are putting their money when they're doing investment. I think that signals element is very critical because the frontline was telling us during the Defence, Security, and Resilience Lab that they didn't fully understand some of these risks and the way in which they actually needed to change or would consider changing their investment strategies or their lending. So we realised there was a disconnect between possibly what the operational resilience part of financial services firms understood versus the frontline that is making the investment decisions. And that really came out quite clearly for us.
The other one was around the infrastructure and actually a lot of it is privately owned, and I think that was a surprise for a lot of people within the lab, because there was an assumption by many around the room that it was something that was publicly owned. And the last one, and this one was a surprise for me at least, was actually the importance of some of the analogue technology. So there's all these elements that I think you could see the penny dropping in a lot of people's minds as we went through the day and the exercise.
Jason Mitchell:
Really interesting. Before we jump into the details, Sherin, maybe talk a little bit more about how the notion of resilience has already been pretty embedded within the military ranks, the Navy admirals and commodores that were there at the lab that day.
Sherin Aminossehe:
It is much more embedded, but also I think it's interesting because one of the questions to me was about also is resilience more than the things that go bang or the people who help things that go bang, so beyond the aircraft, beyond the ships, beyond the soldiers?
And that's something whilst is understood by the military, I think one of the key things about the broader resilience thing is that it is a whole of society approach. So it's not just about the military stuff, which is what our people mainly think about. It is actually about the whole picture. It is about those undersea cables, but it's also about financial sectors. It is about wider businesses. It is about their continuity plans. And it's one thing for us to say, you've got to be prepared, but actually we don't own all of those levers. It's one thing one business having its own continuity plan. It's another thing entirely making sure that those are linked together so you don't have lots of separate things that don't entirely talk to each other. Alicia Kedzierski: And speaking with my many hats, so having spent a lot more time on the sustainability side, what has been surprising for me personally was actually after a period where the conversation around sustainability got a lot more complicated, actually dealing with the defence sector has been quite eyeopening in terms of you are not going into those rooms and arguing at all about the importance of energy resilience because it is baked into that resilience that Sherin was talking about. So there's a lot more of an overlap that I think I personally was expecting to see within that space, because ultimately on both sides, what we're really aiming for is broader resilience.
Jason Mitchell:
So a question for both of you here, but let's start with Alicia. The lab found that firms, perhaps not surprisingly, were better at identifying their own weaknesses than these shared systemic dependencies. So when we talk about the idea of this whole of society kind of resilience, what does that really mean? What changes in practise? In other words, what can a financial firm do on its own and what requires collective action and what must a government ultimately take responsibility for? I'm kind of trying to pin down where those responsibilities currently fall between all those actors. Alicia Kedzierski: And this is just my personal view in terms of how I think that all the different roles fit together, but when I hear a whole of society approach, I see it as each one of us and each one of the institutions that we are in has to take an active role within our mandate and us as individuals and citizens within the country, and we have to play that role quite actively. So obviously this is something that the government has called for, and speaking from an FCA perspective, it is important to flag that we do not direct the flow of capital where it's invested, et cetera. But one of the things that we can do is, for example, clarify, build evidence bases, understand where the frictions are in broader defence investment.
And we can convene. So after we clarified that there was nothing within our rules that prohibited the investment into the defence sector, we also went further and realised that we could convene that lab, bring people together, try to raise that awareness around these systemic risks, and we also can build evidence bases because for better or worse, financial services has to talk to us. So it gives us a lot of latitude to be able to go in, have those conversations and understand where different frictions lie.
So that is our role, but in terms of the broader role and something that I think did come out of the lab was that the government has a responsibility for providing some of those signals, which I know Sherin can speak about at great length. And also the public financial institutions, they play their role in the way in which certain investments are de-risked or enhanced from a credit enhancement perspective.
The market has to engage and invest. They are, and we've seen that over the last year or two, they are building their capability in that. And one of the things that I think we also have to acknowledge is the firms, in particular the SMEs, they also have to look at the commercial component of this, because financial services is a commercial proposition. So we all have our role to play and I think that's what it really comes down to.
Jason Mitchell:
Sherin, what would you say from the MOD's perspective, where does industry's responsibility end and government's begin? And I think also, are there gaps between the two that you think we still need to close?
Sherin Aminossehe:
As always, I always agree with Alicia. Alicia Kedzierski: I make her say that.
Sherin Aminossehe:
Nah, I just say it anyway. I think it's also important to note given that today is budget day, excitingly enough, that Alicia's point about the puffins and defence, that it's been a positive budget for both of those areas. So that's important to note, I think, in this.
The other thing I would say is this is very much about shared outcomes. So whilst government, to me, would have to set the strategic threat picture, and that's really what MOD does in conjunction with other parts of the government, our point is also about clarifying responsibilities and setting expectations for other parts of the system effectively as it were. So we would only intervene if the risk was systematic and systemic or if it's national security. We don't own a lot of these physical assets where the criticality is important, but we need to set the expectations of the outcomes that we expect should there be any issues or to prepare for war or difficult outcomes.
And that clarity, I always feel from government is really, really important, which is why the national conversation is really important, because even if there isn't going to be a war tomorrow, we need to prepare and make sure that we are ready.
Jason Mitchell:
Sherin, I want to stay on you and jump lanes to the MOD's Defence Investment Plan or DIP as they say, which was published this past June. What's interesting is that beyond military readiness, the plan recognises homeland defence, cyber and resilience is really big priorities. So if the public conception of defence still largely revolves around ships, aircraft, and soldiers, what belongs in our picture of homeland defence today? In other words, how do you avoid treating every critical piece of infrastructure as automatically an MOD responsibility? And how do you be more selective about what goes into that picture?
Sherin Aminossehe:
So I would actually say we don't need to always be selective about that picture. And I speak as a former director of infrastructure. I think the problem is when we become too selective, people honestly just think about defence stuff as shiny things that go bang. But whereas that resilience picture is much more important and actually the dip speaks to that, it is of course about things that go bang. It is also about the infrastructure, the things that don't willingly move, but it's also about the people as well. So an important part of the Defence Investment Plan was also about investment into things like cadets in terms of broader people things, veterans, but also industrial skills.
So this links very much, I think, to what Alicia was saying. It isn't just about defence at its core, but it's also about how we interact with industry. So for example, one of the parts of my role is the industrial skills packages, the defence technical excellence colleges, the defence universities alliance. If those parts aren't ready, then having an aircraft here or a carrier here won't get you very far.
Jason Mitchell:
Alicia, it's fair to say that COVID provided a real world exercise in resilience, basically testing whether firms could keep operating when offices were closed and staff and suppliers were under pressure at the same time. And then we got cyber attacks, which obviously can pose a very, very different challenge in that the systems we depend on may no longer be safe to use. But from my understanding, these two areas have been pretty big wins in terms of resiliency for the FCA. What lessons from those experiences should we apply to national security preparedness? Alicia Kedzierski: It's an excellent question because COVID was this moment for us where I think the views that we might have had of what resilience meant were probably quite challenged and brought into focus. I suspect there were a lot of people who were probably surprised to see that the thing we all cared about most was actually making sure we had grocery access and-
Jason Mitchell:
And toilet paper. Alicia Kedzierski: ... and toilet paper. Yes, these were the big things. But COVID ultimately was around prioritising services that matter, not necessarily, or recognising that we weren't going to be able to get back into BAU during certain periods. Cyber, I think, is much more complicated in a way because what you see there is the system that we are all relying on, you may not be able to trust the system that you are on. And that is not just for financial services, but it is across the board in terms of many of the services that we all use every day. And very critical services, including one would definitely be around access to financial services, but also health and others.
So in terms of broader resilience, I think the lessons that I would take from it would be around the need for a systems wide approach. You can't just do this in silos. And I think that was something that we were thinking of in the design of the Defence, Security, and Resilience Lab was how do you bring the wider system together? Because these threats are so much more complex that we can't just go off and solve it by having one part of the sector sit in a room and think about it.
I also think there's another element around we need those conversations and we need quite collective action. And again, that whole of society element where we all have to step in and realise what role we can play and need to play within the space.
Jason Mitchell:
Alicia, I want to come back to one area from the lab specifically on points of failure, which were a pretty big issue that day. What did you take away that was convincing at a firm level? What would persuade you that a firm's redundancy is genuinely resilient, not just a second contract with the same underlying point of failure? And I think by extension, what do you think boards should be asking their suppliers and even each other? Alicia Kedzierski: I should specify that our firm level resilience work is our core supervision work, and that's quite separate to what the lab was there to really test and look into. So we do a lot of work within that space and ensuring that firms are resilient is pretty core to our objectives and the wider FCA mandate.
However, with the Defence, Security, and Resilience Lab, when we published our findings on our website, we actually gave examples of questions that the board could ask within their own conversations. And at a high level, what we typically would expect to see is a mapping and not just of your direct supply chain, but actually the fourth party providers and further down your supply chain and understanding what your dependencies are.
Beyond that, I think the more mature firms, what they would do is also use that mapping to then inform the choices they make about their business. So whether or not that is further testing, understanding their vulnerabilities, the remediation that they might take, how they prioritise where they invest, but also then the actions that they need to take to bolster their systems.
And one of the elements that we would expect is that boards are actively engaged within those conversations, especially as the landscape is becoming more complex, boards should think about how they strengthen their own understanding of these risks and what dependencies they have across the wider system.
Jason Mitchell:
Got it. We're obviously talking a lot about resilience at the firm level, but what were your impressions of resilience at a systemic level? I'm talking about things like the cascading economic and societal effects of, let's say, markets spilling into one another. Alicia Kedzierski: So one of the elements that we designed into the lab was actually bringing a wide cross section of different financial services firms into the room so that we could get a better sense of where those both shared dependencies were, but also the way in which some of that spillover would happen. I should also clarify that there are absolutely lots of different stress tests that both ourselves, the bank, and the wider industry is already involved in. And what we were trying to capture within the lab was the understanding again of that front line of how those cascading effects would work. Because the operational resilience side of those firms would typically have a much stronger understanding of those shared dependencies, but it was the front line where we wanted to test the level to which broadly we saw an understanding of it because they are the ones that are making the investment decisions and they are the ones that need to be able to understand where those dependencies are and are going to be relying on some of those government signals to make the decisions.
So I think at a system-wide level, we do have a fairly good understanding of what those dependencies might be through a wide variety of different sources, but this was about making sure that that was actually intersecting with the decision makers.
Jason Mitchell:
Sherin, there's an obvious uncomfortable trade off here in that resilience can sometimes mean pain for redundancy, in other words, capacity that may end up rarely being used. So how do you think government and maybe even boards should judge when that cost is justified? And who bears it when the benefits are spread across all of society? I mean basically, how do you avoid the moral hazard problem here of creating an expectation that government will always pick up the bill that can end up sometimes weakening firms' incentives to invest in their own resilience?
Sherin Aminossehe:
That's always been a really interesting question and something that is both commercially very relevant, but also in terms of government budgeting, as you're saying.
So for me in terms of businesses, this is very much obviously, as you said and linked to what you asked before, is very much a board decision, but boards need to think about the impact to their services and likelihood of things going down. This isn't just about a war scenario. To me, it's about a service disruption scenario. And I would say that that is the same about government as well. And we've seen that in some of the utility companies where issues about backlog maintenance are now coming to play out in a different way.
In my previous role, one of the really interesting things about that whole resilience conversation is people would start by saying, "But this is really expensive. We can't have two of everything or three of everything." It is not fundamentally actually about doing that. It is about looking at the criticality of those things that you want to invest in and having a tiered approach to that criticality. So from the most to the least, and then using what available resources you have.
As an example though, when you don't treat that issue betimes, so again, going for example, to something that's quite sort of easily tangible which is backlog maintenance, when you don't address those issues at the outset, it can take or it can cost more to the point between 5 to 10 times more than rectifying it when there is a catastrophic issue.
Jason Mitchell:
Interesting. Alicia, how do you think about setting those expectations, and especially the trade-offs involved? Alicia Kedzierski: On the trade-offs, I think as a regulator, that really resonates because it's always very hard to prove that something hasn't happened and that the actions you've taken have been supportive of that. I think ultimately it's about who gets the benefits. So where firms find that there is a benefit to them, it is easier for them to make the commercial decision to invest in different resilience measures. Obviously where those benefits are more dispersed, then there may be an expectation or a benefit from having more public funding in that space.
In terms of one of the topics that we've discussed today, which is cybersecurity, we know that that's a priority and HMT in their value of resilience report, which they published over the summer, did already set that out. And they also did explain that the costs of mitigating those risks are lower than the costs of dealing with the attacks. So I think those will be the trade-offs that firms are thinking about and that we're all thinking about at a systems wide level.
Jason Mitchell:
Alicia, staying with you here. One of the clear messages from firms from the lab is that they wanted a much clearer national threat picture before committing capital. So one of the takeaways was that the FCA would explore better intelligence sharing. Say more about this. What kind of information could really change a bank's or an investor's decision without obviously exposing sensitive information? I'd say that some people may worry that it kind of creates a system where only the biggest firms are capable of acting on it. Alicia Kedzierski: So that was absolutely one of the takeaways that we had and something that I think came out quite strongly from the participants of the lab. And I would hasten to add that there is already a lot of intelligence sharing that happens, but it is with different parts of the system. For example, the operational resilience parts of major institutions. So I think there is something about using those existing channels and the foundations that we already have, but we may need more.
That is something that we may be exploring further, but there is an element where if there is an appetite, and that is what I think the government is saying around private capital being part of the investment and the solution in building UK resilience, then we do need a conversation about what feasibly they need to understand and what signals they need to be able to dedicate that capital. And that's something that I know is on Sherin's mind and on wider government's.
Sherin Aminossehe:
I completely agree. Transparency is such an important part of that. And the feedback that we are getting from the market, just as Alicia said, is very, very similar.
To me, again, going back to that whole of society approach, we need to think about, as government, what scalable information is like. So you can't tell everything to everyone all at the same time, but also you can't then not share and then expect people to react on information that is not available to them. So for me, it's things like common briefings, practical guidance, what is the core picture that everybody needs to be aware of? But in terms of also finance, getting in private sector finance, we need to be really clear about A, what the demand signals are, but also what is that allocation of risk that we want to have, both in terms of commercial risk, but then also in terms of wider risk, what is that big thing that we are addressing together and therefore what does that mean?
Jason Mitchell:
How clear is that understanding of where that red line sits between intelligence sharing and national security? And I think more to that, how has that red line, that dynamic evolved over time?
Sherin Aminossehe:
I would say it depends. I mean, this is not my area of expertise, but I would say you look at archives, I'm a trustee of the Imperial War Museum, what we would've considered to be sensitive many, many decades ago is not necessarily what is the same now. But then there is always, I think, a clear balance and it's always better to be safe rather than sorry. But there's a balance in terms of what is in the national interest to share and things that need to be kept obviously to a smaller group of people.
But I think sharing threat pictures is something that government has done for quite a while. Most government buildings have a little label on to tell you what the threat picture is on that particular day that everybody sees where you go in. So that isn't secret. I think what is important is what goes into that threat level and therefore you as a private sector company going, okay, the threat level is severe. Do I need to be worried? What does that actually mean for my business? Do I need to do anything differently? Alicia Kedzierski: From a financial services perspective, financial services probably doesn't need, not everybody within the sector needs a full map of every single vulnerability. What they need is clarity and they need to understand what the national priorities are and they need something that can be turned into investible information. And I think those are quite big differences.
Sherin Aminossehe:
I agree. Yeah, absolutely.
Jason Mitchell:
Alicia, we can talk a lot about attract investment, but it kind of feels like there's a much more basic question here. And it's really about whether a small defence business can get and keep a bank account and make the payments it needs. What are you hearing from defence SMEs about where those services really become difficult to access? Basically, how do you start to distinguish legitimate financial crime and sanctions concerns from, let's call it an overly broad aversion to the defence sector? Alicia Kedzierski: So you're asking me this with very, very good timing, because on Monday we actually published our findings in this space. Because one of the things that we took away from or one of the actions that we took away from the Defence, Security, and Resilience Lab was that we would look into the narrative that we have heard quite a few times that SMEs are being debanked. And speaking to quite a large cross section of financial services firms, one of our big findings was that actually the picture is much more nuanced and a lot of SMEs are not necessarily being debanked, but they are experiencing a wider range of frictions than we would expect them to.
And one of the pieces that we have reiterated to the market is that we do expect them, that's the financial services firms, to really understand the customers that they are dealing with, because there is such a broad range of activity that can sit under the defence sector. And it is challenging if firms are being painted with a broad brush. An SME that is creating munitions would be very different in terms of the risk profile of that firm. So it's important that financial services firms are taking into account the customers themselves and the exact risk profile of those customers.
However, financial services firms, they do all operate to their own risk appetites and they do take those various decisions and factors into account. But we didn't actually find widespread debanking. We found unnecessary frictions.
Jason Mitchell:
Really interesting. I'm going to come back to revisit some of these points in a second, but Sherin, what do you think an investible defence or a resilience opportunity looks like in concrete terms? I mean, what's the missing ingredient here? Is it a long-term customer? Is it a faster procurement decision, or a way to share risk or something else? Talk more about how the Defence Investment Plan employs the defence finance and investment strategy as an investment roadmap to turn priorities into market facing propositions.
Sherin Aminossehe:
See this is very exciting because watch this space. On the 1st of December when we have the Defence Investment Summit, we will be unveiling the defence finance and investment strategy at the same time.
To me, all of what you have said is relevant. MOD, Defence, government needs to be a better customer. We're very aware of that. We have been looking at our procurement systems, our approval systems. We know that they need to be quicker and more responsive and we are definitely working on that. And part of this has also been announced in the budget today in terms of broader finance and investment work that we are doing with the Treasury that links into a defence investment roadmap that we can share more widely, be more transparent and make sure that that develops into proper investible propositions that the private sector knows what's coming up, what kind of things we need, what the owners are and what is the route to procurement.
But linking that to SMEs as well, because it's not just about the big primes, we've also committed to increasing our SME spend by 50%. That is really critical. That's roughly around an extra 2.5 billion pounds, which is quite a lot. And we know that whilst we work with quite a lot of SMEs already, they need that confidence that we are going to be there giving them the contract, being a good client that gives them that assurance then in terms of financing and the investors who then go and back them up. So that is really, really critical.
But also we need people to be open with us. We need people to come back and tell us when there are issues, when there are problems, because Defence is a large organisation. But we are aware, we do know that we need to improve and we are taking active steps to do so.
Jason Mitchell:
Interesting. To that point, it seems like winning a defence contract and having the cash to deliver it aren't necessarily the same thing. Where do smaller suppliers get caught between government procurement and let's say a bank's willingness to lend? What would make the biggest difference? Is it faster payment or is it greater certainty over orders or is this even something the MOD is trying to solve for? Is it something that has to sit with the private sector?
Sherin Aminossehe:
It's really like a jigsaw though, isn't it? So it's all of the things that you mentioned, but if you don't put all the pieces together, then actually it doesn't work. It doesn't work as a whole. You can't just give certainty but then not sort out payment terms. You can't sort out one other bit of it but actually not have that good relationship between primes and SMEs and sort out procurement frameworks and access and so on and so forth. So to be honest, I think it actually needs to be a little bit of everything to bring the whole picture together.
Jason Mitchell:
Alicia, from the financial sector side, which of those changes do you think would most help lenders maybe think about and ultimately finance these kinds of businesses? Alicia Kedzierski: So this is where I think it's not always helpful for us to talk about financing defence, because actually one of the things that we have absolutely found in our work and the engagement with firms within the space is that different sectors have different needs. So investors, they need clear signals from government. Lenders, they need credit enhancement or they do need something, perhaps different forms of credit enhancement like guarantees. So it's quite a broad range of needs that different sectors would have within this space.
What I do think is absolutely critical is, and this is one of the things that we have definitely been focused on, is actually talking to them and understanding what are those basics of what they require to be able to go into that space. And from a lot of our conversations, we do find that the hypotheses parts of the sector might have, you actually often find in having the conversations, you discover it's actually a very different need or a different friction. And I think it's important to do that digging to understand what is actually going to make a difference.
I think there is also something about, in some cases I have found, and this is my personal view, that some people are selling different platforms or different solutions that aren't actually going to make a difference. They sound like they're great, but when you really dig into it with firms, they say that's not really going to unlock investment. And that's why I think that specificity in those conversations are so important.
Jason Mitchell:
Alicia, Nikhil Rathi, the FCA's chief executive has talked about how the FCA's sustainability rules don't really block defence investment, but the reality is that firms could still face reputational, ethical, and even commercial constraints. So if the rules aren't the barrier, what actually is?
As chair of UK SIF, I've worked with the great UK SIF team and the Royal United Services Institute to produce the report, our ESG standards, the scapegoat for stalling defence growth. And that report tries to kind of defang this whole issue. And ultimately, we found that ESG rules don't really prevent investment in defence. Rather, it was more about uncertain government procurement cycles and SME access to finance as we talked about.
But how do you think about how an investor should distinguish a legitimate ethical choice not to finance an activity from an avoidable, let's call it a misunderstanding that stops a defensible investment? Alicia Kedzierski: So first of all, I did see the UK SIF and the RUSI report and I was pleased that it was aligned with our defence statement. So thank you.
I think it's important to go back into investors are completely entitled to make their ethical views and their choices known, and it's not for the regulator to intervene on telling them how they want to invest their money.
I do think that the defence sector, it is a very wide sector. It's a complicated sector with many different elements under it. And where the FCA does care is if there is marketing to consumers that promises certain exclusions but then those exclusions are not being met, that would be problematic, because that would be against probably a variety of different rules and requirements that we would have, not least of which would be fair, clear, and not misleading.
I also know that there are initiatives, market-led initiatives within the space already thinking about what further information and guidelines might be useful to the market and to that investor base to help give them that clarity and different frameworks for how they might want to invest within that space, including GRID, which is the Guidelines for Responsible Investment, which I think has already consulted and is looking to finalise shortly. So you'll know from the sustainable finance space, we're always massively supportive of market-led initiatives, and hopefully that is one that will give further clarity to investors in terms of how they can approach it.
Sherin Aminossehe:
Yeah, I just wanted to comment on that as well. So to me, the FCA stance has been really, really helpful to us, because fundamentally for us, without national security, you cannot have economic security or prosperity. So for people to actually go, "Is it ethical to invest in defence?", for us is quite a intriguing thing to say because that national security is the pillar of what so many things depend on.
What to me is interesting as I've been in this role for the past nearly a year and a half is at the beginning, even in such a relatively short space of time, I've seen, I think, as a result of things in the press, news, et cetera, that that opinion about investing in defence has changed and moved on. Right at the very outset, we were with some international institutions who shall remain nameless, but one was even really sensitive about investing in a security in a prison because they were worried that if those prison guards used unnecessary force, define that, but used force that then caused harm to a prisoner, whether that was ethical in their eyes or not. So that's one very extreme end. We now have people sort of saying, "We're very happy in investing in munitions at the other end." So it has moved on and it's good to see.
On a personal level, really interestingly, one online payment platform, we'll leave their names out of this, recently decided, apparently this now came out after their apology, had seen my name and I had been linked to the work that I do in defence finance and investment and decided that they would block my online payment account. Now, this is really interesting. And they had therefore asked me to provide two years worth of income tax returns, which you can imagine I had actually refused.
So when I then complained, finally, after about three weeks when they deigned to respond, and they actually phoned me up to apologise, which is again rare for this online payment platform, and I said, "You do realise that what I do and this is just not right. Did you flag me?" They refused to answer the question, but did say, "We are very aware of what you do." Need I say more.
Jason Mitchell:
Such an interesting and worrying anecdote. But I want to come back to the point you both made, which is that the debate has moved on, but what does that mean? Where does it sit? It still feels unresolved with more to be done. Is it financial instruments like war bonds or is it something else?
Sherin Aminossehe:
The war bonds was really interesting. I have to say the fiscal position on this one that government is not in the business of issuing new debt. So I can assure you that war bonds are not in the picture.
But one of the key things that we want to achieve through the Defence Investment Summit is to actually say what is the broad range of where finance is needed for defence? The problem is, and we go back to the earlier part of our conversation, it isn't just about shiny things that go bang. There is housing, there's utilities, there's infrastructure, there's the broader societal approach that we've been talking about. So actually, no matter what your risk appetite is or what your sensitivity on whether it's right to invest or not, there is actually an asset class for you in defence, which will hopefully actually make your shareholders not feel uncomfortable if you are concerned about some of the more pointy end of things.
Jason Mitchell:
It's interesting. In the sustainable finance world, we talk a lot about this spectrum of capital through the context of, let's say, returns and impact. But what you're describing is essentially a defence oriented version of this spectrum of capital where an investor, obviously depending on their preferences, risk level and mandate can kind of find a home somewhere again on that spectrum.
Sherin Aminossehe:
Exactly. You absolutely can. Alicia Kedzierski: But this is where the perceptions of the defence industry I think really come in, because I would say on a personal level, having lived in quite a few different jurisdictions around the world, we've been quite lucky in the UK in terms of how little we've had to think about the security of our nation over the last 20 years. And actually it is one of those things where once you really dig into the sector, you get a much broader range of assets that if you're less familiar with the sector, you wouldn't expect that there's barracks that need to be funded. That's fairly vanilla real estate asset.
And I think that has been a large part of what we have seen over the last year, maybe 18 months is the maturing of the conversation within this space and the extent to which different parts of the market are gaining that much more deep understanding of what does defence as a sector really include.
Jason Mitchell:
Alicia, we're obviously talking a lot about defence security and resilience, but there are probably a lot of businesses that strengthen national security in some way or form who would never describe themselves as defence companies. I'm thinking of cybersecurity, maybe emergency communication, probably even backup power generation. But do you think that distinction matters when they look for banking or finance? I mean, how do you encourage financial firms to evaluate what a business actually does instead of just relying on some sort of sectoral label? Alicia Kedzierski: So I think that's what we were really reestablishing in terms of our own expectations as the FCA with the market, with what we published on Monday, because one of the key messages within that was that we do expect financial services firms to really understand the businesses that they are banking. And that includes not making certain assumptions about the defence sector, but understanding the specifics of that business and the risk profile that they bring.
So yes, that is definitely on our radar. That's something that we are encouraging firms through our publication and ongoing engagement to get them to ensure that they are not making those blanket assumptions about firms. And I think that goes to the heart of what we've been discussing more broadly, which is defence is such a broad range and it is important for financial services institutions to really think about and understand the exact customer that they are dealing with, specifically for that reason.
I think in many cases, and I think it is important to call out, from our conversations we are seeing that there is a broad range of capital that is thinking about how do they support broader national security resilience. So I do think the financial services firms, the desire to be more active in this space, we are seeing that start. It is something that I suspect the defence financial investment, both summit and strategy will help them understand and have those signals and develop that understanding further.
Jason Mitchell:
Sherin, we've talked about intelligence sharing earlier, but let me approach it from a slightly different tack. What I mean is that there's an obvious tension between seeking private investment and acknowledging the need to protect national security and commercially sensitive information. But how do you think government can give investors enough visibility to commit long-term capital without advertising those vulnerabilities? Are there fundamental risks that governments should fund or underwrite themselves instead of expecting the private sector to shoulder them?
Sherin Aminossehe:
Yeah, absolutely. And I don't think there is as much of a tension necessarily as we think, because fundamentally investors need a clear account of the outcomes required, the commercial model effectively, the procurement pathway and the categories of risk. What we have started in the Defence Investment Plan is the first step of this. The investor's roadmap that we'll be talking about in more detail as part of the defence finance and investment strategy in the summit will be the next stage of this and translate that demand signal into a credible commercial pathway and the information around it.
What investors don't need however, which goes back to your question, they don't need access to operational vulnerabilities, they don't need access to classified intelligence. But you can talk about what actually needs to be funded without sharing any of those, because the two can be, I think, relatively easily separated. We can provide, as I've said, through the investor's roadmap, through visibility, through pipelines, controlled data rooms, security cleared engagement. And one of the things that investors have been asking for a long time is the concept of a compliance passport, which we've been looking at as well. So this to me then actually can de-risk it and make it clear that by sharing projects alone, you're not sharing classified information.
Jason Mitchell:
So final question for both of you. Sherin, let's start with you. A year from now, what one observable change would convince you that the notion of the whole of society has moved beyond just pure rhetoric? In other words, what should we watch as some kind of indicator for proof of greater resilience within defence?
Sherin Aminossehe:
I think there are so many strands to that question, so very cunning to put it as the last one. So I would start with that resilience is recognised beyond government and it is a normal conversation that we have without toilet roll selling out. That to me is one of the key indicators. What I a bit more seriously, I would like to see fewer hidden single points of failure. The fact that we have these conversations more and more and an understanding beyond government what resilience means.
And beyond government, I actually mean at regional level, at local authority level, because actually a lot of core services are not necessarily delivered through government. It is through regional government and local authorities through mayoral strategic authorities and they're really critical for that picture. And then of course the other layer is the private sector that we've been talking about.
So for me, to be able to actually see in a year's time that there's a shared understanding would be a really big step.
Jason Mitchell:
Great way to finish. What would you say, Alicia? Alicia Kedzierski: I think something that we've already touched upon is there's already been such a shift in how these conversations are happening and the level of understanding across the sector about what resilience and actually how broad resilience is that in one year's time what I would be really thrilled to see is that the conversation has further matured from still thinking more about the firm specific risks, which obviously as the FCA, we do care about the level of firm resilience, but into a much more mature state of understanding the shared systemic risks, dependencies, but also those opportunities, and that the frontline and the lenders, the investors, the decision makers and financial services are actively involved in that. And more broadly that they have the signals, they have the capability, and they have the confidence to be able to invest within that space and to be able to lend.
And I think the last one that I would add is an action that we're not talking about it, but we're seeing those capital flows and the wide variety of capital flows that are needed for SMEs and for defence more broadly, that that's actually happening in practise.
Jason Mitchell:
That's a great way to finish. So it's been fascinating to talk about why defence, security, and resilience are shared priorities for government, the financial system, and society, what the recently held Defence, Security, and Resilience Lab revealed about the hidden dependencies that connect individual firms to our national infrastructure and how clear responsibilities, shared intelligence, and access to finance can turn whole of society ambition into investment and measurable resilience. So I'd really like to thank you for your time and insights.
I'm Jason Mitchell, CIO for Responsible Investment at Man Group, here today with Sherin Aminossehe, Director of Growth and Missions at the Ministry of Defence, and Alicia Kedzierski, Head of Sustainable Finance and Defence, Security and Resilience at the FCA. Many thanks for joining us on A Sustainable Future, and I hope you'll join us on our next podcast episode. Sherin, Alicia, thank you so much for your time today. This has been super, super interesting.
Sherin Aminossehe:
Thank you so much. Alicia Kedzierski: Thank you so much.
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